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BOOK REVIEWS
MORALITY AND THE LAW
by Enoch Samuel Stumpf
Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville,
Tenn., 1966. Pp. 247. $5.00.
Reviewed by
DR. BRENDAN F. BROWN *
This book was written by the Chairman
of the Department of Philosophy at Van-
derbilt University. Its purpose is to
refute the claims of modern legal phi-
losophy that "law has no moral connota-
tions whatsoever," by demonstrating that
the concept of the essence of law must
include the element of morality. In the
first three chapters, Dr. Stumpf shows the
error of the three great historical theories
which have maintained that there can be,
and is, a separation between law and mor-
ality, namely, "that law is what the courts
do in fact, second that law is the will
of the economically dominant class, and
third that law is the command of the
sovereign." In the fourth chapter, the
author uses world society to prove the
error of these three theories by applying
them to international law. In the fifth
* A.B. (1921), LL.B. (1924), Creighton
University; LL.M. (1925), J.U.B. (1926), J.U.L.
(1926), J.U.D. (1927), Catholic University ot
America.
chapter, the author discusses natural law
as the basis of the legal order, and in the
sixth, some points of intersection between
law and morals.
Professor Stumpf has convincingly
shown that it is impossible for any pos-
itivist judge or jurist to construct a legal
theory of positive law without moral con-
tent. The author has made a fine con-
tribution to the literature of natural law
thinking, and has effectively attacked pos-
itivism by showing, from the writings of
the positivists themselves, that it is im-
possible to separate law from morals al-
together. Both spring from the spiritual
nature of man, and both are intended to
provide guidelines for the direction of
human behavior. The inextricable con-
nection between law and morals is clear
in the writings of some of the positivists,
but hidden in the works of others. Thus,
Kelsen and Holmes would appear to deny
this connection, but the author has shown
that they admitted it covertly or implicitly.
Hobbes and Austin have clearly em-
phasized in their writings the inseparable
relationship between law and morals.
Professor Stumpf has marshalled unde-
niable evidence that positivists have intro-
duced morality, either idealist or utilitar-
ian, into their legal theories in many dif-
ferent ways. Thus, Kelsen postulated a
"basic norm," moral in nature, as his
starting point. Austin bottomed law on
the nature of man. Holmes referred to
"fair play" and "natural justice" in some
of his opinions. Hobbes admitted the ex-
istence of "natural laws," and the right
of the individual to physical survival even
against Leviathan. Soviet jurists have
been moving in the direction of assuming
an ideal standard, so that Soviet Socialist
law is no longer regarded as the will of
the economically dominant class, but of
the will of the whole people.
With new insights, the author has con-
clusively proven that there is no breach
between law and morals in the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United
States. This is so in spite of the doctrine
of separation of powers, the restrictions
of federalism and the force of moral skep-
ticism. It is true, of course, that the
moral element is often handled in an
elusive way. Evidence of its existence in
the work of the Court is in "the simple
fact that the Court consciously changes its
mind on important matters and consciously
seeks to implement its judgments of value
into the judicial process." Further evi-
dence is to be found in the interpretative
process of the Court. Thus, the author
has demonstrated that in the recent civil
rights cases it is manifest that the four-
teenth amendment has been interpreted as
the expression of what the law "ought
to be," in the light of the moral di-
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mensions which that amendment expresses.
It is undeniable that moral judgments are
operative in the reasoning of the Supreme
Court, indeed of all courts and legis-
latures.
Dr. Stumpf does not deny, however,
that all positivist writers have separated
morality from the essence of law, as
distinguished from its environment and
content, in the construction of their legal
theories, so that they consider the com-
mand of the political sovereign to be law,
even though it is obviously unreasonable
and unjust. The author correctly main-
tains that positivist legal theory supplies
some of the elements of law, such as the
will of the political sovereign and physical
sanctions, but that it errs in making the
source of positive law control and domi-
nate all the other elements with reference to
the essence of law.
The book apparently leaves unanswered
the question why positivists place the
source of law in the dominant position
in formulating their concept of the es-
sence or nature of law. Do positivists
make the fact of political order in society
the highest objective moral good, so that
the highest type of moral behavior con-
sists in obedience to the commands of the
sovereign, which are regarded as the only
way of insuring order? If this is so, then
the author might have gone further than
he did and concluded that positivists have
not separated law and morality even
in regard to the essence of law. Their
error would then consist rather in choos-
ing the morality of order as the highest
good, instead of the dignity of the in-
dividual human being, who is more im-
portant than order, since the order in
question is good only insofar as it pro-
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motes that dignity. If this is so, then
there is an irreconcilable difference of
view between positivism and natural law
theory as to the question whether the
moral element of law, springing from the
intrinsic value of the human person,
should take precedence over the moral
element of the command of the political
sovereign.
In the opinion of the reviewer, the chief
limitations of the book consist first, in its
apparent attempt to minimize the dif-
ference between positivist and natural law
thinking, and second, in the rejection of
the Thomistic starting point of natural law
doctrine and the acceptance of the natural
law arguments of Hobbes. In one sense,
it is commendable that the book has been
written in an ecumenical style so as not
to be denunciatory of positivism. It may
be, however, that the book has gone
somewhat too far in appeasing positivism.
Thus, it is the opinion of the reviewer
that it is certainly not an oversimplification
of English positivist political theory to say
that the British Parliament is absolutely
sovereign. This theory is not mitigated,
as theory, when the author writes that it
is not followed in practice. The fact is
that it could be followed. This theory is
not undermined by the conclusion that
members of a society "look for the source
of law in places other than in the com-
mands of the state." Of course, positiv-
ists may reject their own theories in prac-
tice, but no theory may be whitewashed
by showing that it is not being followed
in a particular society. Of what avail is
it to write that Austin "certainly did not
contemplate that law had no moral char-
acteristics," as long as Austin was con-
vinced that law is law, whether just or un-
just? What difference does it make func-
tionally? Is the reader to conclude that
positivist legal theory is not as sociologic-
ally dangerous as it was thought to be up
to this time?
Second, the greatest limitation of the
book is its presentation of natural law
doctrine. This is indeed unfortunate in
a work so favorable to natural law think-
ing, and so effective in proving that mor-
ality is not only a part of the environment
and creation of law, but also of its very
essence. The author seems to have little
sympathy for the way in which Thomas
Aquinas and the Stoics approached the
doctrine of natural law. He dismisses
the theory of Aquinas, in regard to eternal
law, natural law, and human positive law
as a "neat architectonic relationship,"
which rests "in the end, upon a theological
base."
In the opinion of the reviewer, the
divine revelation of theology was not the
authority upon which Aquinas based his
doctrine of natural law, although that was
the authority upon which he grounded
the supernatural law. The author does
not distinguish clearly between theology,
in the sense of the knowledge of God's
will through revelation (supernatural law),
and theodicy, in the sense of the knowl-
edge of God's will through human reason
alone (natural law). Aquinas based his doc-
trine of natural law upon a philosophical
basis of reason, which proclaimed the im-
mutable value of the dignity of the in-
dividual person. This was also the think-
ing of the Stoics and Augustine. But the
author dismisses their theories, as well
as the doctrines of such giants as Plato
and Aristotle, because "in most of these
cases, the theory of natural law becomes
so wrapped up with special concepts of
purpose and belief that they appear pre-
sumptuous to readers whose thinking is
pursued in a pluralistic setting."
Every type of natural law thinking, even
that advocated by Dr. Stumpf, postulates
some ideal, as he so well brings out, and
in that sense will be "presumptuous" to
readers who do not agree with it. The
fixed value in the writings of the great
historical natural law thinkers, beginning
with the Stoics, was the dignity of the in-
dividual person. Certainly this is a more
spiritual and more worthwhile starting
point for a theory of natural law than the
physical fact of animal or body survival
with which Hobbes begins his doctrine.
Yet, Dr. Stumpf apparently prefers this
starting point.
It is regrettable and ironic that the
author goes to Hobbes for a workable
and contemporary theory of natural law.
It is strange that the author should turn
to Hobbes, who is regarded as the arch-
positivist in the English speaking world,
to formulate a minimum argument for
natural law. Hobbes did more than any
thinker in England to destroy the natural
law thinking which was based on the
dignity of the individual. His writings in-
spired Austin, who fabricated the Analyti-
cal School of Jurisprudence. According to
Hobbes, natural law was what the state
said it was, with the exception of the
individual's right of physical survival. The
state interpreted the natural law. But the
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natural law which Dr. Stumpf is advocat-
ing in his book is one which may be ap-
pealed to as an extrinsic authority against
the state and its tyranny.
There can be no law of any kind, in-
cluding the natural law, without a law-
giver. This is so because law is a com-
mand which ought to be obeyed because
of its reasonableness. But it is idle to
speak of obedience in this context if there
is no person, with will and reason, to be
obeyed. A human being cannot obey a
thing. This truth is included in the
natural law doctrine of some of the pagan
Stoics, and of such Christian writers as
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas who lo-
cated the source of natural law ultimately
in the will of God, knowable and known
by reason alone. The exclusion of this
truth is one of the great defects in the
theory of Hobbes as to natural law and
the essence of human positive law.
In conclusion, Dr. Stumpf is to be con-
gratulated for his publication of a scholar-
ly, original, and comprehensive study of
the perennial question of the true rela-
tion which should exist between the law and
morals. It could have been written only
by one with the unique and unusual edu-
cational background and experience of
Dr. Stumpf, who is learned in theology,
philosophy, and law. It will do much to
dispel the misunderstanding concerning
the attitudes of positivists toward moral-
ity and the law.
